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TREATING TRIBES AS STATES UNDER THE FEDERAL
CLEAN AIR ACT: CONGRESSIONAL GRANT OF
AUTHORITY- FEDERAL PREEMPTION-INHERENT
TRIBAL AUTHORITY
INTRODUCTION
When Congress amended the Clean Air Act (CAA or Act) in 1990,
it added a new provision permitting the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA or Agency) to treat Indian tribes as States for purposes of regulating
environmental air quality. The amendments broaden tribal regulatory
authority over air resources within reservation boundaries and other areas
under tribal jurisdiction.' Section 7601(d), in particular subsections (d)(1)
and (d)(2), gives the EPA discretion to treat tribes as states for purposes
of implementing the Act. 2 This section also requires the EPA to promulgate regulations providing for tribes "to assume responsibility for the
development and implementation of CAA programs on lands within the
exterior boundaries of their reservations or other areas within their jurisdiction."3
Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the EPA published a proposed rule implementing the amended section 7601(d) of the
CAA on August 25, 1994. 4 The Agency received a number of comments
from tribal representatives, state agencies, and organizations representing
utility companies. Commentary opposing the proposed rule challenged
tribal authority to regulate environmental air quality through CAA programming. It also focused on the proposed territorial grant of jurisdiction
suggested by the EPA's language under the proposed rule. This Comment,
however, contends that the tribal authority to regulate environmental air
quality under the plan proposed by the EPA stems from two sources:
(1) a valid federal delegation; and (2) inherent tribal authority to regulate
conduct within territory under tribal jurisdiction.
Part I of this Comment briefly discusses the EPA's policy statements
and proposed implementation scheme of the CAA for tribal regulation

1. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (1990).
2. Id. § 7601(d)(2), (3). The proposed rule provides a list of CAA provisions and implementing
regulations that would not apply to tribes. See 59 Fed. Reg. 43,980 (1994). Included on the list
are national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) deadlines for submittal of plans or programs,
mandatory sanctions for failing to submit CAA implementation plans, and program approval
provisions that require a showing of criminal enforcement authority. Tribes would, however, be
treated as States for failing to adequately implement or enforce approved tribal air programs. Id.
at 43,959.
3. Indian tribes: Air Quality Planning and Management, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,956 (1994) (to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 35, 49, 50, 51, 52, 70, 81) (proposed Aug. 25, 1994).
4. Id. The proposed rule has three primary provisions. The first outlines CAA provisions in
which the EPA determined it is appropriate to treat tribes as states. The second provision establishes
eligibility standards for tribes choosing to receive such treatment. The final provision extends existing
federal financial assistance programs to qualified tribes involved in the implementation process. 59
Fed. Reg. at 43,961-43,968, 43,972-43,974.
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of air resources within Indian country.' Part II outlines the EPA's
proposed framework of eligibility requirements for a tribe to be treated6
as a state in order to become qualified under a particular CAA program.
Part III examines the EPA's interpretation of the CAA as a federal
congressional delegation of regulatory authority to tribes.7 This part
analyzes the relevant federal case law, statutes, legislative history, and
other relevant CAA provisions that support the EPA's inference of a
valid federal delegation of authority. Part IV discusses whether the proposed amendments act to preempt any subsequent attempts by states to
regulate air resources within Indian country." Finally, Part V explores
the role of inherent tribal authority over environmental regulatory programs and compares that authority with the EPA's proposed interpretation
of tribal regulatory jurisdiction. 9
I. EPA POLICY STATEMENTS AND THE PROPOSED
IMPLEMENTATION SCHEME OF THE CLEAR AIR ACT BY
TRIBES
The central premise of the EPA's Indian policy is to promote tribal
self-determination. 01 The EPA's expressed policy statement for reservationbased environmental programs takes affirmative steps to encourage and

assist tribes to assume greater responsibility over such programs." Pur5. See infra text accompanying notes 10-23.
The CAA uses the statutory definition for Indian country, which states that Indian country
encompasses:
[A]I1 land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the
United States Government ....
all dependent Indian communities within the borders
of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and ... all Indian
allotments, the Indian titles to which have not be extinguished.
18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 24-84.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 85-117.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 118-154.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 155-176.
10. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA MEMORANDUM ON FEDERAL, TRIBAL
AND STATE ROLES IN THE PROTECTION AND REGULATION OF RESERVATION ENVIRONMENTS 1 (Nov. 10,
1991) [hereinafter 1991 EPA MEMORANDUM] (formalizing the EPA's "role in strengthening tribal
governments' management of environmental programs on reservations"). As a principle, self-determination recognizes the paramount role tribal governments serve in setting the future for their own
communal affairs. Id. See also Reagan Administration Indian Policy Initiatives, 19 WEEKLY COMP.
Plus. Doc. 98, 99 (Jan. 24, 1983).
il. U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA POLICY FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMS ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS 1 (Nov. 8, 1984) [hereinafter 1984 EPA POLICY
STATEMENT]. The 1984 EPA POLICY STATEMENT sets forth nine (9) principles. First, the Agency
stands ready to work directly with tribes. Second, the EPA recognizes tribes as the leading environmental policy makers within Indian Country. Third, the EPA will help tribes assume implementation responsibilities and develop programs. Fourth, the EPA will remove legal and procedural
barriers and constraints. Fifth, the Agency will assure consideration of tribal concerns and interests.
Sixth, tribal and state cooperative agreements are encouraged by the Agency. Seventh, the EPA
will work with other agencies to assist tribes in assuming responsibility for environmental programs.
Eighth, the Agency will work with tribal governments to bring tribal enterprises into compliance;
non-tribal enterprises not in compliance will become subject to EPA enforcement actions. Finally,
the EPA will incorporate these policy principles into planning and management activities. Id.

Spring 1996]

TRIBES AS STATES UNDER CLEAN AIR ACT

suant to this statement, the EPA recognizes tribal governments as sovereign
nations and has expressed its intent to work directly with tribal governments as the sole authorities over reservation affairs, not merely political
subdivisions of the states.12 The EPA's policy recognizes tribal sovereign
authority, responsibility, and accountability over the environments of
their communities and lands. The Agency's proposed interpretation of
the CAA, as a valid delegation of congressional authority, furthers this
explicit policy.
The EPA treats tribes as states for most environmental statutes both
when expressly provided for by statute 3 and where a fair interpretation
of otherwise silent laws "permit[s] it to delegate program authority to
native governments.' ' 4 Even without a finding of express congressional
delegation, the EPA may interpret silent laws as a delegation when viewed
in light of the Agency's stated policies.' 5
In keeping with the express policy statement promoting tribal selfgovernment, the EPA's proposed implementation process of the CAA
contains provisions that treat tribes as states. As will be shown throughout
this Comment, this treatment is the center of controversy among those
opposing the 1994 Amendments.
Currently, the CAA is implemented in regards to States governments
in one of two basic ways. The first method occurs "through a cooperative
partnership between the States and the EPA. 16 Under this method, the
EPA sets the national standards and requirements, and the States assume
the responsibility for the implementation process. 7 In order to implement
a program, a state must first demonstrate that it has adequate legal
authority and resources to meet the minimum federal requirements. 8 If
the state can demonstrate this, the EPA delegates to the state the authority
to implement and enforce the Act's provisions. 9 However, the EPA
reserves the right to monitor enforcement and compliance, and the right
to bring an enforcement action against suspected violators. 20
Under the second method of implementation, the EPA assumes primary
responsibility for both setting the national standards and for program

12. Id. at 2. See also U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA MEMORANDUM ON EPA
(Mar. 14, 1994) (reaffirming EPA's 1984 formal policy statement on Indian tribes).
13. Treatment as State (TAS) provisions are statutorily proscribed in the Clean Air Act (CAA),
42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(1) (1990); the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e) (1988), 40 C.F.R.
§ 131.8 (1994); and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-ll(b)(1) (1986). The
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6986 (1994) is the only
remaining major federal environmental statute that does not contain a TAS or similar provision.
14. Judith V. Royster & Rory SnowArrow Fausett, Control of the Reservation Environment:
Tribal Primacy, Federal Delegation, and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REv. 581, 638
(1989) (discussing the delegation of environmental program authority to tribal governments).
15. See id. at 638 (citing Nance v. Environmental Protection Agency, 645 F.2d 701, 714 (9th
Cir. 1981) (the Nance court found that the EPA's interpretation was permissible even though there
was no express language in the CWA permitting the EPA's actions)).
16. 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,957.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
INDIAN POLICY

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

implementation .21 This method is reserved for programs that require a
as a program
high degree of uniformity in the implementation phase, such 22
to phase out substances which deplete stratospheric ozone.

The EPA's proposal permits tribes to assume responsibility for developing and implementing the CAA mandates pursuant to the first
method of implementation described above. The debate among public

commentators centers on two separate issues: first, whether the CAA or
relevant case law can be interpreted as a federal congressional grant of
authority to tribes; second, the "extent and nature of tribal jurisdiction
over environmental activities on [and off] reservations. ' 23 This debate
asks the question, "If the CAA is a valid grant of congressional authority,
is it of the nature proposed by the EPA?"
This Comment suggests that the statutory language of the CAA, case
law, and federal Indian policy all support tribes' authority to implement
the CAA, as do states, and the EPA's interpretation of the extent of
tribal regulatory authority. Nonetheless, the EPA's proposed interpretation

of the jurisdictional grant under the treatment as a state process seems
to open itself up to potential challenges by those who seek to preserve

existing state authority over air resources outside of reservation boundaries
but within the inherent jurisdiction of a tribe.

II.

TRIBAL ELIGIBILITY FOR TREATMENT AS A STATE
UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT

The CAA, as originally enacted, did not provide for tribally imple-

mented clean air programs. The 1990 CAA amendments first established
the tribes as states provisions.2 4 The CAA's 1994 amendments propose

to expand the jurisdictional base of tribal regulation over air resources
to lands outside reservation boundaries but still within the tribes' jurisdiction. 25 Under the 1990 CAA amendments, to be eligible for treatment

as a state, a tribe must first show that it is federally recognized pursuant
to section 7602(r), 26 and then must meet the three eligibility criteria set

21. Id.
22. Id. For additional examples of programs administered under this process, see 42 U.S.C.
§§ 7671-7671q (1990). Programs under this method will be largely unaffected by this proposed rule.
23. David F. Coursen, Tribes as States: Indian Tribal Authority to Regulate and Enforce Federal
Environmental Laws and Regulations, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,579, 10,585 (1993) (reviewing environmental laws and regulations, and EPA policies on the treatment of tribes as states for purposes
of the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Clean Water Act, and the Clean Air Act).
24. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 107(d), 104 Stat. 2399, 246465 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d) (1990)).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(B).
26. Section 7602(r) defines the word "tribe" as "any Indian tribe, band, nation, or other
organized group or community, including any Alaska Native village, which is Federally recognized
as eligible for the special programs and services provided by the United States to Indians because
of their status as Indians." 42 U.S.C. § 7602(r).
Implementing regulations for the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Safe Drinking Water Act
(SDWA) also require federal recognition as part of their TAS requirements. See 33 U.S.C. § 1377(h)(2)
(1988) (accepting the Secretary of the Interior's recognition of a tribe and requiring documentation
that the tribe is recognized by the Secretary); 42 U.S.C. § 300f(14) (1986) (defining a "tribe" as
an entity with a federally recognized governing body).
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forth in section 7601(d)(2). 27 Federal recognition and the three criteria
combined are commonly known as the "treatment-as-a-state" process.
The three eligibility criteria set forth in section 7601(d)(2) require that a
tribe's governing body, (1) carry out substantial governmental duties and
powers, 2 (2) have authority over the exterior boundaries of the reservation
or other areas within tribal jurisdiction, 29 and (3) be capable of implementing the CAA requirements and applicable regulations. 0
The 1990 amendments streamline the treatment as a state eligibility
process by permitting a tribe to undergo eligibility review at the same
time that the tribe seeks approval for a particular program. 3' Moreover,
the proposed eligibility process would eliminate the need for duplicating
TAS applications under several federal environmental programs, including
the SDWA and CWA. 3 2 Thus, tribes need only make one showing of
federal recognition under the proposed rule. 33 This Part will now detail
the three eligibility criteria required under the proposed section 7601(d)(2).
The main source of contention for opponents to the proposed rule focuses
on the EPA's proposed interpretation of tribal regulatory jurisdiction.
A. Tribal Demonstration of Substantial Governmental Duties and
Powers
The first criteria under section 7601(d) requires a tribe to demonstrate
that it "has a governing body carrying out substantial governmental duties
and powers. ' 34 If a tribe has successfully shown under the Clean Water
Act (CWA) or the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) that it meets the
.governmental duties and powers requirement, it need not make the showing
again under the CAA.3 5 A tribe will still need to show, on a case-bycase basis, however, that it is capable of carrying out the program's

27. See 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2). In general, the criteria are similar to those set forth in the
CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1377(e)(1) (1988), and the SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-l1(b)(l) (1986).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(A).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(B).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(C).
31. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,962.
32. The tribes that submitted comments to the proposed rule greatly support the proposed
eligibility process as it will eliminate many of the administrative burdens of duplicative showings.
See e.g., Letter from Kevin Gover, on behalf of the Campo EPA, the Pueblo of Pojaque, the
Shoshone Tribe, and Pueblo of Sandia, to the EPA 3 (Nov. 22, 1994) (on file with the author)
[hereinafter Campo Letter] (supporting the streamline of the CAA's TAS process); Letter from Nez
Perce Tribal Executive Committee to EPA (Nov. 21, 1994) (on file with the author) [hereinafter
Nez Perce Letter] (providing "wholehearted support for ... the 'streamlined' process for eligibility.");
Letter from St. Regis Mohawk Tribe to EPA (Nov. 21, 1994) (on file with the author) [hereinafter
St. Regis Letter] (expressing support for EPA's streamlined procedures).
33. 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,962.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(A).
35. 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,962. An additional requirement under the SDWA is that tribes must
certify this criterion through a narrative statement "(1) [d]escribing the form of tribal government
and the types of essential governmental functions currently performed, and (2) identifying the legal
authorities for performing those functions." 59 Fed. Reg. 13,816 (1994) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R.
pts. 35, 130).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26

functions,3 6 and that it has the requisite regulatory authority.3 7 The EPA's

goal is to minimize the burden placed on tribes in making this initial
the time and expense
showing of governmental power, and to 3reduce
8
tribes incur under duplicative submissions.
A tribe that has not made an initial demonstration of governmental
power under section 7601(d)(2)(A) will meet this requirement if it is
"currently performing governmental functions to promote the public
health, safety, and welfare of its population within a defined area." 3 9
Examples of these functions include levying taxes, acquiring land by
exercising the power of eminent domain, and providing and exercising
police powers. 4° Finally, to satisfy this requirement, a tribe must submit
a narrative statement "which describes: (1) the form of Tribal government,
(2) the types of essential governmental functions currently performed,
... and (3) the legal authorities for performing these functions." ' 4'
B. Tribal Regulatory Jurisdiction- The "Extent and Nature" of the
Delegation of Authority to Tribes Over All Areas within the Tribe's
Jurisdiction
1. Section 7601(d)(2)(B) delegates regulatory authority to tribes over
lands outside of formal reservation boundaries.
Section 7601(d)(2)(B) requires that "the functions to be exercised by
the Indian tribe pertain to the management and protection of air resources
within the exterior boundaries of the reservation or other areas within
the tribe's jurisdiction." 42 Under this requirement, the tribe "must identify,
'43
with clarity and precision, the exterior boundaries of the reservation.
A tribe's submission must contain enough information to demonstrate
to the EPA the location and limits of its reservation. Tribes will satisfy
this requirement by including a map and a legal description of the area
with the submission.Unlike other major federal environmental programs, the EPA proposes
an extended interpretation for the regulatory jurisdiction criterion for
tribes under the CAA. This extended interpretation is the heart of controversy. Regulations interpret the amended statute as an express congressional delegation of authority to tribes to regulate air resources both

36. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(C). This appears to deviate from the Agency's requirements under
the CWA process where tribes are required to make a showing of both regulatory jurisdiction and
capability for each new CWA program.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(B).
38. See Letter from Michael P. O'Connell, on behalf of the Puyallup Tribe, to EPA 9 (Nov.
18, 1994) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Puyallup Letter].
39. 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,962. The United States Supreme Court used similar language in Montana
v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1980), to define the limits of retained inherent tribal authority over
the conduct of non-Indians on reservation fee lands. Id. at 566.
40. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,962.
41. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C § 7601(d)(2)(B) (1990).
43. 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,962.
44. Id. Similar requirements are found under the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1377, and the SDWA, 42
U.S.C. § 300j, and raised no real issue among the public comments to the proposed rule.
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inside Indian country and outside technical reservation boundaries, assuming the tribe can make a particularized finding of authority over the
off-reservation source. 45 The EPA proposes to determine the extent of
- the term "reservation"
for each tribe on a case-by-case basis, taking
into consideration whether the regulated conduct has a direct effect on
the tribe's health or welfare substantial enough to support tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. 6 In addition, "[tihe EPA will be guided by
relevant case law in interpreting the scope of 'reservation' under the

CAA.

47

The EPA relies on Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma 48 to include in its interpretation trust
lands validly set aside for use by a tribe, but not formally labeled a
reservation. 49 Citizen Band Potawatomi questioned whether a state may
levy a tax over cigarette sales occurring on tribal trust lands. 0 The
Oklahoma Tax Commission argued that since the sales did not occur on
a formal reservation, the exercise of state taxing authority was valid. 5'
The Court rejected this argument stating that "the test for determining
whether land is Indian country does not turn upon whether that land is
denominated 'trust land' or 'reservation.' Rather we ask whether the area
has been 'validly set apart for the use of the Indians .... ,,,52
Thus, Citizen Band Potawatomi supports the EPA's interpretation of
tribal regulatory authority over air resources located on trust lands outside
formal reservation boundaries.53 Opponents of the proposed rule attempt
to limit Citizen Band Potawatomi as applying to only Oklahoma tribes.
Nowhere in the opinion, however, does the Court purport to limit its
holding to Oklahoma tribes.
2. Commentary opposing tribal regulation of areas outside formal
reservation boundaries.
A central reason for the EPA's reliance on Citizen Band Potawatomi
is that the Supreme Court's determination of Indian country is much
broader than a tribe's original reservation boundaries, as opponents of
the proposed rule claim. The EPA, consistent with existing legal precedent,

45. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,958 n.2, 43,960, 43,962-43,963.
46. 59 Fed. Reg. 43,958 (citing Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima
Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989)).
47. 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,960.
48. 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
49. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,960.
50. Citizen Band Potawatomi, 498 U.S. at 505.
51. Id. at 511.
52. Id. (quoting United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634, 648-49 (1979)).
53. In its comments to the proposed rule, the State of Oklahoma took great issue with the
EPA's interpretation of a "reservation." Letter from Department of Envtl. Quality, State of
Oklahoma, to EPA (Nov. 23, 1994) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Oklahoma Letter]. The
State claims that the EPA's interpretation of the term "reservation," if taken literally, would deem
almost the entire State of Oklahoma an Indian reservation, and thus, would subject the entire State
to tribal regulation under the CAA. Id. at 2. Oklahoma suggests the EPA "should limit the term
to include ONLY tribal trust lands." Id.
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it is to be
has stated the status and use of the land will determine if
4
reservation.1
term
the
of
interpretation
included within the
Opponents nonetheless contend that formal reservation boundaries should
be the exclusive basis for defining the geographical area of a tribe's
regulatory authority." They reason that: (1) the plain language of
section 7601(d)(2) contravenes existing language of the CAA; (2) the
proposed amendments open the door to potential jurisdictional conflicts;
(3) the amendments create uncertainty for the regulated community; and
(4) the amendments impermissibly extend greater authority to tribes than
states with regard to interstate pollution.16 The focus of these concerns
is the prospect of a tribal government regulating non-Indian businesses
and individuals located outside the external geographic boundaries of
reservations.5 7 Opponents fear that these businesses and individuals may
not be afforded the right to participate in tribal rulemaking and legislative
processes. 8 To remedy this perceived inequity, commentators suggest the
EPA should require tribes to submit a description of tribal administrative
procedures that will be afforded to all reservation residents, as part of
the Agency's review process.5 9 These four concerns will be discussed
immediately below.
First, the purported contravening language is found in 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(o) which addresses Tribal Implementation Plans (TIPs). Section
7410(o) provides that TIPs "shall become applicable to all areas ...
located within the exterior boundaries of the reservation, notwithstanding
the issuance of any patent and including rights-of-way running through
the reservation." 6" Opponents claim that this language prohibits the
amended grant of authority to tribes over off-reservation areas described
in section 7601(d)(2)(B). The EPA, however, believes that the two pro-

54. See Treatment of tribes as states for purposes of §§ 308, 309, 401, 402, and 405 of the
CWA, 58 Fed. Reg. 67,966, 67,976 (1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 123, 124, and
501).
55. Letter from El Paso Natural Gas Co. to EPA 1 (Nov. 23, 1994) (on file with author).
56. See Letter from Richard Hayslip, Salt River Project Manager, to EPA 4 (Nov. 21, 1994)
(on file with author) [hereinafter SRP Letter]. See also Letter from Susan M. McMichael, Asst.
General Counsel, New Mexico Environment Department to EPA 4 (Nov. 22, 1994) (on file with
author) [hereinafter New Mexico Letter]; Letter from the Utility Air Regulatory Group to EPA
(Nov. 23, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter UARG Letter]. UARG is a voluntary, non-profit
organization of electric utilities and various associations who represent the utility industry.
57. There is also concern for non-Indian businesses and individuals within the exterior boundaries
of a reservation. The Environment Department for the State of New Mexico expressed reservation
about recognizing tribal jurisdiction over "non-Indian owned lands . . .in the form of villages and
municipalities which may be surrounded by the exterior boundaries of a Pueblo grant." New Mexico
Letter, supra note 56, at 2 (emphasis added).
58. See SRP Letter, supra note 56, at 3.
59. There are some distinct advantages to tribes that decide to develop a mechanism for public
participation throughout the process. See Dean B. Suagee & Christopher T. Stearns, Indigenous
Self-Government, Environmental Protection, and the Consent of the Governed: A Tribal Environmental Review Process, 5 CoLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & PoL'y 59, 78-79 (1994) ("[T]o the extent
that tribes involve non-Indians in the process of .. . the exercise of tribal regulatory authority over
nonmembers, the courts may be more inclined to sustain such exercises of tribal authority. To the
extent that nonmembers feel that tribal regulatory authority programs if they so desire, many such
cases may be resolved without recourse to the federal courts.").
60. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(o) (emphasis added).
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visions may be fairly interpreted as supporting a grant of regulatory
authority over all resources within the tribe's jurisdiction without nullifying
6
either statutory provision. '
Second, opponents claim that the proposed amendments open the door
to potential jurisdictional conflicts. The non-Indian petitioners in Nance
v. Environmental Protection Agency 62 claimed that if the court construed
the CAA to delegate redesignation authority to tribes, both the Act and
its regulations would comprise an unconstitutional delegation of authority
in violation of due process. 63 The court stated that "[tihis argument is
seriously flawed. . . . [I]t hinges on the view that while Indian tribes
possess attributes of sovereignty within the reservation, they are mere
'private voluntary organizations' with respect to any effects outside
the
reservation." 64 To the contrary, tribes possess inherent "attributes of
sovereignty over both their memhers and their territory. ' 65
While the EPA recognizes that jurisdictional disputes may raise a
difficult problem, it nonetheless remains firm that such disputes will not
overcome the Agency's ultimate responsibility of protecting the environment.66 As such, the Agency will leave issues of tribal jurisdiction over
areas outside of original reservation boundaries within the tribe's jurisdiction to a case-by-case determination.6 1
Third, opponents contend that the proposed rules create uncertainty
for the regulated community. However, the uncertainty of the regulated
community will in no way be eliminated by a narrow interpretation of
jurisdiction limited to geographic boundaries. The exercise of tribal sovereignty, like the exercise of state sovereignty, as it relates to the regulation
of air quality will inevitably have extraterritorial effects on neighboring
communities. 68 The CAA currently has three provisions which specifically
address interstate air resource activities and should provide one mechanism
for addressing uncertainty in the regulated community. 69 The proposed
jurisdictional grant of authority to tribes in no way alters the pre-existing
schemes, but, in fact, serves to support those provisions.
Finally, opponents suggest the proposed rule extends greater authority
to tribes than states with regard to interstate pollution where states have

61. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,959.
62. 645 F.2d 701 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub. nom., Crow Tribe v. E.P.A., 454 U.S. 1081
(1981).
63. Id. at 714 ("namely that such a delegation gives Indian tribes authority to affect land use
by non-Indians outside the reservation area.").
64. Id. Nance addressed a constitutional challenge to the delegation of redesignation authority
to Indian tribes. Id.
65. Id. (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832)).
66. See id. at 715.
67. See 59 Fed. Reg. 43,960; 58 Fed. Reg. at 67,976 (1993).
68. See generally Nance, 645 F.2d at 715.
69. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7410, 7426, and 7474 (1990). The proposed rule specifically states that the
provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 7426 will "apply to tribes in the same fashion that they apply to states
so that a tribe or state may take such action to remedy pollution [from an extraterritorial source]."
59 Fed. Reg. at 43,977.
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70
no regulatory authority beyond their geographic borders. The CAA
contains interstate air pollution provisions that address air pollution
71
coming from other jurisdictions. In addition, the EPA proposes to apply
with equal force the CAA protection against interstate pollutant transport. 72 This concern leads directly into future jurisdictional disputes the
EPA will be called upon to settle. The proposed rule raises the potential
for increased litigation over either asserted or existing tribal jurisdictional
boundaries in an effort to assert state regulatory authority. Opponents
expressed great concern with the fifteen day comment period suggested
under the proposed rule. States would have fifteen days to comment on
a tribe's assertion of jurisdiction over air resources located both off and
on the reservation. Opponents suggest fifteen days is an insufficient
amount of time in which a *state may dispute the tribe's jurisdiction,
because the evaluation of reservation boundaries, a complex and potentially lengthy issue, will be likely to involve much more than glancing
at a map or legal description. 7 The fifteen day comment period applies
as a single boundary decision; thus the EPA could rely on the initial
boundary determination in subsequent considerations for tribal administration of other EPA programs. The proposed rule has a fifteen day
extension provision where a tribe includes detailed jurisdictional statements
in its application.
Opponents have a strong concern regarding the EPA's proposed scope
of authority in determining a tribe's jurisdictional limits. One commentor
noted that "[d]etermining the geographic scope of an Indian Reservation
or an Indian Tribe's jurisdiction is beyond any authority granted to EPA
Resolution of this issue would likely turn on the
under the Act . . . .
of the Department of the Interior and
expertise
the
on
EPA's reliance
federal Indian law.
of
principles
following established
the EPA itself addresses many of
or
precedent
legal
While existing
The tribal regulatory capability
clarification.
require
will
some
issues,
these
requirement, albeit less controversial, also raised some general criticisms
from the impacted communities. This requirement also presents some real
opportunities for tribes and states alike to move forward in the pursuit
of "[slound environmental planning and management [through] the co-75
operation and mutual consideration of [tribal and state governments].
"'74

70. 42 U.S.C. § 7407(a) of the CAA provides that "[e]ach State shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area comprising such State ......
Id. (emphasis added).
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
72. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,964.
73. See New Mexico Letter, supra note 56, at 6 (describing the comment period as "unduly
burdensome" and recommending a 60 day period); Oklahoma Letter, supra note 53, cmt. 7 (stating
the 15 day comment period is "totally inadequate" to cover disputes over off-reservation areas);
Letter from Mary A. Throne, Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality and Wyoming Assistant
Attorney General, to EPA 2 (Nov. 23, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Wyoming Letter].
74. SRP Letter, supra note 56, at 2.
75. 1991 EPA MEMORANDUM, supra note 10, at 12.
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C.

Tribal Regulatory Capability Requirement
Under section 7601(d)(2)(C), an EPA regional administrator must determine whether a tribe is capable of carrying out the functions to be
exercised in a manner consistent with the terms and purpose of the Act.7 6
Currently, tribes must undertake a program-specific inquiry for each
program. If a tribe presently lacks the necessary administrative or technical
skills to regulate a program, it may present to the EPA a plan showing
how it will acquire the needed skills. 77 In either instance, the tribe "must
submit a fully effective program that meets all the applicable statutory
and regulatory requirements associated with the program. '78
The proposed rule sets forth the details for the capability requirement
and the factors to which the EPA may look when evaluating a tribe's
demonstration of capability. 79 Among the factors the EPA may consider,
and of particular importance for this discussion, is the relationship between
regulated entities and the tribal administrative agency that will be charged
with the program. 0 Other facts the EPA will consider are the relationship
between the existing or proposed tribal agency responsible for implementation and the potentially regulated tribal entities, and tribal government mechanisms for carrying out executive, legislative, and judicial
functions.8 ' These three factors raise a host of issues regarding tribal
authority over nonmembers, and tribal authority over tribally-run enterprises. With regard to the latter, the EPA warns of potential conflicts
of interest, and recommends that tribes create independent organizations
to regulate tribal entities subject to CAA requirements.1 2 Tribes should
be able to use any existing mechanisms that further this goal, such as
tribal consortia 3 and the modular approach,8 4 but may also want to
consider establishing an independent agency or department to administer
the Act's programs.
Much of the commentary opposing' the proposed rule challenges the
authority of tribes to regulate activities impacting environmental air quality

76. See 42 U.S.C. § 7601(d)(2)(C) (1990).
77. The proposed rule clearly states that a tribe will not fail to demonstrate capability due to
a lack of experience as it creates a "dilemma of being denied the opportunity to develop the
requisite capability because [it] lack[s] such capability." 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,963.
78. Id. at 43,963-43,964.
79. See id. at 43,963.
80. See id.
81. Id. The EPA proposes three other specific factors to be used in the determination: (1) the
tribe's previous management experience; (2) existing environmental/public health programs currently
administered by the tribe; and (3) technical/administrative capabilities of staff to administer/manage
the program. Id.
82. 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,963-43,964.
83. Tribes may form "tribal consortia" under the proposed rule. The collective technical expertise
and resources of the consortium may be used by the individual tribe to meet the capability requirement.
59 Fed. Reg. at 43,964. The collective expertise and resources may only be used to indicate that
a tribe is "reasonably expected" to be capable of carrying out the regulatory functions whereas
the individual tribe remains responsible should the consortium efforts fail. Id. The tribal commentators
to the proposed rule spoke favorably of this provision. See St. Regis Letter, supra note 32, at 16.
84. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,968-43,969. See also Campo Letter, supra note 32, at 5; Puyallup
Letter, supra note 38, at 9.
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on reservations or other areas within the tribe's jurisdiction under TAS
provisions. Part IV will now address the sources of and challenges to
tribal authority to regulate air quality through the CAA.
III.

THE CAA AS A FEDERAL DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY
TO TRIBES

The implementation of federal environmental statutes' TAS provisions
is based on tribal jurisdiction. Congress is the source of power for the
CAA. Under existing Supreme Court precedent, Congress has broad
authority to delegate legislative powers to Indian tribes as governing
85
entities with sovereign authority over their lands and members. If a
tribe plans to regulate the activities of nonmembers on non-Indian feea6
States,
lands, even if it does not meet the test of Montana v. United
The
delegation.
it may still obtain the authority through congressional
of
grant
direct
a
of
following discussion centers on the EPA's finding
boundaries
reservation
federal congressional authority within the exterior
(the "territorial approach") for all air resources covered under the CAA.
The center of controversy among opponents to the proposed rule is the
EPA's extension of civil regulatory authority over air resources located
outside of original reservation boundaries.
Federal Case Law Supports a Delegation of Authority to Tribes
The EPA interprets the 1990 CAA amendments as a federal grant of
authority, for approved tribes, over all air resources "within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation. 8 a7 The EPA interprets the CAA as follows:
It is EPA's proposed interpretation of the CAA that the Act grants,
to Tribes approved by EPA to administer CAA programs in the same
manner as States, authority over all air resources -within the exterior
A.

boundaries of a reservation for such programs ... enabl[ing] such

owned
Tribes to address conduct on all lands, including non-Indian
8
fee lands, within the exterior boundaries of a reservation. "
The Agency acknowledges that tribes generally maintain inherent sovereign
authority over air resources within the exterior boundaries of the tribe's
reservation .89

85. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) (holding that Congress possessed authority
to regulate the introduction and distribution of alcohol and properly delegated that authority to
tribes). See also Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832) (stating
that tribes, as separate sovereign entities, posses "the power of regulating their internal and social
relations").
86. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
87. 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,959.
88. 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,958.
89. See id. at 43,958 ("[Tlhe sovereign authority of Indian Tribes extends 'over both their
members and their territory."' Mazurie, 419 U.S. at 557). The Mazurie Court upheld the federal
delegation of regulatory authority to the Wind River Tribes over lands within the Wind River
Reservation including those held in fee by non-members and non-Indians. Mazurie, 419 U.S. at
554..
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The EPA further recognizes inherent tribal authority through the Supreme Court's holding in Montana.90 In Montana, the Crow Tribe prohibited hunting and fishing within reservation boundaries by nonmembers. 9'
The State asserted authority to regulate hunting and fishing by nonIndians within the reservation. 92 The United States and the Tribe sought
a declaratory judgment to quiet title to the riverbed of the Big Horn
River asserting sole authority to regulate all hunting and fishing activity
within the reservation boundaries. The Supreme Court set forth a two
part test for determining whether a tribe retains inherent authority over
the conduct of nonmembers acting within the reservation or on nonIndian fee land:
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means,
the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with
the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases
or other arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent power to
exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands
within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct
effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health
or welfare of the tribe. 93
The Supreme Court modified the standard for this test in Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Nation.94 In Brendale,
the Court addressed whether a tribe has exclusive jurisdiction to zone
all land within its reservation including any fee lands owned by nonIndians. The reservation of the Yakima Nation consisted of two areas:
one known as the closed area and the other known as the open area.95
The closed area comprised two thirds of the reservation, was primarily
forested, and public access to it was restricted. 96 The open area comprised
the remaining one third of the reservation and was used for agricultural
and residential purposes. 97 Fee lands made up one half of the open area. 98
Both the Yakima Nation and Yakima County maintained zoning ordinances covering the fee lands within the reservation.9 9 The dispute in
Brendale involved two individual zoning applications, one in each of the
areas, whereby the parties received building permits under the County's
zoning ordinances. The proposed developments were prohibited under the
Tribe's zoning ordinance.100
The Yakima Nation filed for a declaratory judgment in federal court
challenging Yakima County's authority to zone fee lands within the

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

See 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,958.
Montana, 450 U.S. at 547.
Id. at 549.
Id. at 565-66 (commonly referred to as the Montana exceptions).
492 U.S. 408 (1989) (plurality opinion).
Id. at 415-16.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 416.
Id.
Brendale, 492 U.S. at 418.
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reservation's exterior boundaries. The Supreme Court found that the
Tribe was implicitly divested of zoning authority over fee lands in the
open area,' 01 and that it had authority to zone all property in the closed
area.'0 2 Justice White heightened the standard under the second Montana
exception. He stated that "[tihe impact must be demonstrably serious
and must imperil the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health and welfare of the tribe.''103 The plurality reasoned that this
standard would sufficiently protect tribal interests while avoiding interference with state sovereignty and providing certainty in zoning regulations
to property owners.' 4
The EPA, citing Brendale, notes that "a Tribe's inherent authority
must be determined on a case-by-case basis, considering whether the
enough to
conduct being regulated has a direct effect . . 0substantial
5 The Agency, hownon-Indians."'
over
support the Tribe's jurisdiction
ever, found that "such a determination is not necessary with a direct
grant of statutory authority."'6 Thus, the EPA does not interpret Brendale
as prohibiting the Agency from recognizing tribes as states for purpose
07
the reservation.
of CAA regulatory authority on fee lands within
As the Agency stated, "[e]ven without this proposed direct grant of
authority, Indian tribes would very likely have inherent authority over
all activities within reservation boundaries that are subject to CAA regulation." 108 The Agency noted that the "high mobility of air pollutants,
resulting area-wide effects, and the seriousness of such impacts 9 would
all tend to support Tribal inherent authority" over air resources.lt What
the EPA seems to infer is that, notwithstanding the stringent language
of the Brendale analysis, the high mobility of air pollutants and potential
for wide-spread adverse impacts is sufficient to fulfill the second Montana
exception. As stated in Montana, "Indian Tribes retain inherent sovereign
non-Indians on
power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction' over
°
""
lands.
fee
non-Indian
on
even
their reservations,
B. Other CAA Statutory Language Supports Congressional Intent for
a Delegation of Authority to Tribes
As noted by the preamble to the proposed rule, the CAA contains
two other provisions expressing congressional intent to provide for a

101. Id. at 432.
102. Id. at 444. Justice White delivered the Court's opinion regarding the open area joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Justices Stevens and O'Connor concurred.
Justices Stevens and O'Connor provided the judgment of the Court regarding the closed area joined
by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
103. Id. at 431.
104. See id.
105. 59 Fed. Reg. 43,958 (1994).
106. Id.
tribes
107. See 56 Fed. Reg. 64,876, 64,877 (1991) (discussing the EPA's position on whether
can "demonstrate authority to regulate water quality within the boundaries of their reservations").
108. 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,958 n.5.
109. Id.
110. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66 (citations omitted).
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territorial grant of authority without distinguishing among categories of
reservation lands. Section 7474(c) provides that, "[1]ands within the exterior boundaries of reservations of federally recognized Indian Tribes
may be redesignated only by the appropriate Indian governing body.""'
In addition, section 7410(o) provides that Tribal Implementation Plans
(TIPs) "shall become applicable to all areas . . . located within the exterior
boundaries of the reservation .... 1""12 The Agency recognizes the inherent
regulatory inefficiency and deadlock that would occur if tribes maintain
jurisdiction over TIPs, but lack the requisite jurisdictional recognition
over non-TIPs."3
Some commentators suggest that sections 7474(c) and 7410(o) strengthen
a narrow reading of CAA's congressional intent, and that the EPA's
discretion in authorizing tribes to implement CAA programs extends only
to areas within the exterior boundaries of a reservation. The inference
from this is that Congress further intended to preserve states' authority
to implement CAA programs in all other areas of the state. 14 As the
EPA points out, however, the argument's logical conclusion "would
nullify or render meaningless [other] statutory provision[s]. '"I" The EPA's
proposed interpretation is a permissible construction of the Act. The
commentators' argument also overlooks the basic canons of statutory
construction of federal Indian law which state that statutes affecting
Indian tribes should be read keeping in mind the federal government's
trust relationship with the tribes, and ambiguous phrases should be
interpreted liberally in favor of preserving tribal rights." 6
The plain language of the CAA, federal case law, and other provisions
of the Act support the EPA's interpretation that the CAA grants tribes
regulatory authority over air resources within Indian Country. Given this
interpretation, Congress becomes the source of tribal regulatory authority
over air resources. As discussed in the next section, the EPA, on a
secondary level, is the source which directly delegates to tribes regulatory
authority over air resources. Congress created a broad environmental

111. 42 U.S.C. § 7474(c) (1990).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(o) (1990).
113. See additional comments and examples under the EPA's discussion in the proposed rules,
59 Fed. Reg. at 43,959.
114. The distinction is made based on the language of § 107(a) which provides that "[eJach State
shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geographic area
comprising such State by submitting an implementation plan for such State ......
42 U.S.C.
§ 7407(a) (1990). As one commentator noted, this provision, when read together with 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410, would require an extraterritorial source to meet State Implementation Plan (SIP) requirements
"to assure attainment and maintenance of ambient air quality standards since the TIP is applicable
only to lands 'within the exterior boundaries of the reservation'
and create an unmanageable
regulatory scheme. UARG Letter, supra note 56, at 6-7.
115. 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,959.
116. See Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe, 471 U.S. 759, 766 (1.985). See also County of Yakima v.
Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 269 (1992); Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978) (providing that courts are to interpret federal laws in
manner that minimizes infringement on inherent tribal authority by "tread[ing lightly in the absence
of clear indications of legislative intent"); ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAw 23032 (3d ed. 1991) (providing an overview of canons of statutory construction)..
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scheme, and the EPA, under its administrative authority, properly es7
tablished a regulatory scheme permissible under this authority."
IV.

FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY POLICY
PREEMPTS STATE INTRUSION INTO REGULATORY
AUTHORITY WITHIN INDIAN COUNTRY

Environmental regulatory jurisdiction within Indian country currently
is allotted among tribal, federal, and state governments each with a
'
different basis for regulatory authority." Federal regulatory power derives9
from "Congress' asserted right of plenary power over native nations'"'
and a judicial doctrine subjecting tribes to federal laws of general applicability. 20 The prevalence of asserted state regulatory authority in Indian
states to perceive Indian country
country arises from a "refusal of the
2
as extraterritorial to state borders."' '

Should a court determine there is no express federal delegation of
authority to tribes, a secondary argument could be made for federal
preemption. 22 There is a strong argument that the CAA, as a paramount
federal environmental statute, and the resulting comprehensive EPA regulatory scheme preempt the regulatory field of air resources within Indian
country. 23 This argument is particularly important, because if a court

117. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
842-45 (1984) (setting forth judicial principles providing administrative agencies with the authority
to formulate policy that fills gaps left in federal statutes, and granting deference to the agency's
construction and interpretation of a statutory scheme unless "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly
contrary to the statute").
118. Royster & Fausett, supra note 14, at 584-85.
119. Id. at 587.
120. Id. at 587-91 (discussing the Tuscarora Rule first articulated in Federal Power Comm'n v.
Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960) (holding that laws of general applicability shall
apply to Indian nations and Indian people absent a treaty or federal statute to the contrary)). See
also Donovan v. Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985) (interpreting the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)); Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation
v. Kurtz, 691 F.2d 878 (9th Cir. 1982) (discussing the federal excise tax), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1040 (1983); Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162 (D.C. Cir.) (National Labor Relations Act),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 928 (1961).
121. Royster & Fausett, supra note 14, at 600.
122. Some commentators have presented the argument that based on the EPA's interpretation of
RCRA and the need for unitary management programs, as viewed against the tribal sovereignty
backdrop, courts would not need to employ a balancing test in the tribal environmental law arena.
See Richard A. DuBey et al., Protection of the Reservation Environment: Hazardous Waste Management on Indian Lands, 18 ENVTL. L. 449, 468-69 (1988). The CAA seems to have even greater
weight behind it to support a similar conclusion, but given the courts' recent reluctance to uphold
assertions of tribal jurisdiction in many areas, a balancing test may be required nonetheless.
123. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (holding state
regulatory gaming laws inapplicable where Federal grants and approval of tribal gaming pervade
the area); Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877,
885 (1986); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983) (holding New Mexico's
hunting and fishing laws to be preempted by federal law where tribal regulations were developed
in close relation with the federal government); Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of ReVenue,
458 U.S. 832 (1982) (holding New Mexico's effort to impose a gross receipts tax on non-Indian
contractor doing business with the tribe preempted by federal law); Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracket, 448 U.S. 136
(1980); DuBey et al., supra note 122, at 468-69 (discussing the TAS processes of the CWA, SDWA,
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should find a state's assertion of regulatory jurisdiction over air resources
under tribal jurisdiction is preempted by federal laws, there would be
no need to go through the Montana test or to meet the Brendale standards.
The Indian preemption test bars "[s]tate jurisdiction . . . if it interferes
or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal
law, unless the state interests at stake are sufficient to justify the assertion

of state authority."12 The Supreme Court has determined the justification

for state intrusion sufficient only in limited contexts. For example, in
Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Department, 25 the Court held that
Washington could regulate the hunting and fishing rights of Indians
within the Puyallup Reservation where necessary to conserve fish and
game. 26 The Court's ruling, however, was based on years of protracted
litigation and the fact that the Tribe had no existing form of tribal
conservation regulations. As noted by the Court, if the Tribe had effective
regulations, they would invariably preempt state regulation.1 27 Further,
as a matter of general Indian law, state agencies have no civil judicial
or regulatory authority over activities in Indian country absent an express
28
congressional authorization.'
Arguably, the CAA constitutes federal law which will preempt any
assertions of state jurisdiction over air resources as states probably lack
sufficient interests to support jurisdiction. 29 This is particularly true within
the exterior boundaries of reservations. It is less clear, however, whether
courts would view the CAA as preempting state authority over the other

and CERCLA and acknowledging that by enacting such statutes "Congress expressly preempted
state regulation of the reservation environment ....
Even if a court ... applie[s] the balancing
test analysis . . . federal and tribal interests are strong enough to overcome any asserted state interest
in regulating the reservation environment." As this article was written prior to the CAA Amendments,
the authors do not specifically address the CAA, but their discussion is relevant to this discussion.).
124. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987) (quoting New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333-34 (1983)). See also Royster & Fausett, supra
note 14, at 602 n.76. Indian sovereignty, self-government, self-sufficiency, and economic development
are to pervade the avenue of inquiry. Id.
125. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
126. Id. at 173-77.
127. Id. at 178. The Court also found that state authority may be asserted where adverse offreservation effects necessitate state intervention. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 724 (1983).
128. See id. (citing Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 332). See also Williams v. Lee, 358
U.S. 217, 220 (1959) (resolving that absent contrary federal authority, a state may not exercise
regulatory authority over a tribe or its land that infringes upon tribal self-government); Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) (holding the laws of Georgia to have no force and effect
on the Cherokee Nation's lands). Even those Public Law 280 states having a limited, delegated
form of civil adjudicatory authority over tribes, have no regulatory authority over Indian reservations.
See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 208 (using the Court's reasoning in Bryan and adopting a dichotomy
between the extent of state civil regulatory and criminal prohibitory authority over reservation
affairs); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 390 (1976) ("[I]f Congress in enacting Pub. L. 280
had intended to confer upon the States general civil regulatory powers, including taxation, over
reservation Indians, it would have expressly said so."); Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423
(1971) (finding Montana court lacked jurisdiction over non-Indian creditor's claim against a tribal
member for a debt incurred on the Blackfeet Reservation).
129. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 151 (1980) (holding that where
the federal government undertakes comprehensive regulation in the harvesting and sale of timber
and where existing federal policy will be undermined by asserted state authority, the exercise of
state authority is impermissible). But see Rice, 463 U.S. at 726.
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areas within the tribe's jurisdiction mentioned in the proposed rule.
Although the EPA proposes that this "territorial view" will require tribes
to make "a fact based showing of [its] inherent authority over sources
located on such lands," 130 this view of Tribal jurisdiction may require
a court to further examine the extent or scope of the EPA's authority
to make such a determination in light of federal preemption. The EPA's
territorial view is supported under both a traditional preemption analysis
and Indian preemption analysis.' However, courts will only apply a
traditional preemption analysis to a case involving a tribal government
where the state action occurs outside Indian country. 132 The CAA provides
for tribal regulatory authority over reservation boundaries and all other
areas within the tribe's jurisdiction. This Comment, therefore, will now
examine the CAA under an Indian preemption analysis.
A.

Tribal Sovereignty as a Backdrop to Preemption
The Indian preemption analysis begins with an inquiry into "broadbased concepts of self-government"' 33 and existing federal policies to
promote tribal self-government, self-sufficiency, and economic development.'3 4 "The Indian sovereignty doctrine is relevant ... because it
provides a backdrop against which the applicable treaties and federal
statutes must be read."'3 Although the backdrop of tribal sovereignty
presents no conclusive finding as to jurisdictional issues, it is important
to tribal interests as it protects tribal sovereignty against attempts of
state encroachment and creates a presumption of federal preemption
against asserted state regulatory jurisdiction.
Federal environmental policies are to be interpreted in light of selfdetermination and self-government. 3 6 The EPA's policy for administering
environmental programs on reservations recognizes the sovereign status
of tribal governments, the independent tribal authority over reservation
affairs, and the underlying tribal responsibility for environmental programs. 3 7 Tribes maintain sovereignty over their citizens and territory, the

130. 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,960.
131. See Royster & Fausett, supra note 14, at 624-28 (presenting the argument that some federal
pollution control laws directly preempt state law under both the traditional federal preemption
analysis and Indian preemption analysis).
.132. See e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973); Blue Lake Forest
Prod., Inc. v. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp., 30 F.3d 1138, 1141 n.6 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 670 (1994).
133. Royster & Fausett, supra note 14, at 603.
134. Id. at 645.
135. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
136. See Administrator Browner, Memorandum on EPA Indian Policy (Mar. 14, 1994) (on file
with author); 1991 EPA MEMORANDUM, supra note 10. See also 1984 EPA POLICY STATEMENT,
supra note 11; Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relations with Native American Tribal
Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22,951 (Apr. 29, 1994); Reagan Administration's Indian Policy Initiative,
19 WEEKLY Comr. PRxs. Docs. 98, 99 (Jan. 24, 1983) (providing President Reagan's statement on
Federal Indian Policy which emphasizes (1) that the federal government will pursue the principle
of Indian 'self-government' and (2) that it will work directly with tribal governments on a 'governmentto-government' basis).
137. See 1984 EPA POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 11, at 15.
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right to control the tribe's natural resources through tribal laws and
customs, and the right to protect the health and welfare of their citizens.
These are all indicia of tribal sovereignty, which are further supported
when tribes establish and maintain tribal environmental agencies, environmental programs, and enter into cooperative agreements with other
sovereigns to assist in the regulation of their environment. 3 8 Moreover,
the CAA provides clear congressional recognition of these attributes in
the Act's language that tribes can be, and in fact should be, responsible
for fulfilling the Act's mandates.
B.

A Balance of Tribal, Federal, and State Interests
In considering the relevant treaties and statutes in light of the tradition
of tribal sovereignty, a court will look to balance the relevant tribal,
federal, and state interests involved. Under this balancing test, a court
would examine the nature of each interest at stake to determine whether
in a particularized context the state interest is sufficient to support the
exercise of state authority.' 3 9
The federal government and Indian nations each have strong interests
in protecting the environments of tribal lands and reservations. The
comprehensive nature of the CAA statute, like many other federal environmental statutes, is one indicia of the strong federal interest.140 Tribes
themselves have important interests in fully exercising sovereign authority
over their citizens and territory: the right to control the tribes' natural
resources through tribal laws and customs, and the right to protect the
health and welfare of their citizens.' 4' The federal and tribal governments
share an interest in protecting tribal sovereignty. 142 To allow states reg-

138. See e.g., Puyallup Tribal Council Resolution 281093-C (1993) (setting forth Tribal Air Quality
Regulations I, II, and III passed in accordance with a Settlement Agreement between the Tribe,
Washington, and surrounding local governments) cited in Letter from Michael P. O'Connell to EPA
Air Docket Office I (Nov. 18, 1994) (on file with author).
139. See e.g., White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 145 (1980).
140. Other comprehensive federal environmental statutes that contain TAS provisions, or similar
provisions, include the CWA, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988); SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300(f)-(j) (1986);
FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1990). See also DuBey et al.,
supra note 122, at 469-70 (describing, in general, some of the federal interests in protecting tribal
lands from an environmental prospective).
141. See DuBey et al., supra note 122, for a succinct description of the various federal and tribal
interests served by excluding state control. Although discussed primarily in support of RCRA
regulatory authority, the interests apply equally as well to authority over air resources. The authors
include, among others, a strengthening of tribal governments' infrastructure, promotion of tribal
economic priorities, and an increase of business investment potential. DuBey et al., supra note 122,
at 470-71. See also Douglas A. Brockman, Note, Congressional Delegation of Environmental Regulatory Jurisdiction: Native American Control of the Reservation Environment, 41 WASH. U. J.
URB. & CONTEMP. L 133, 139 (1992).
142. The federal government has an interest in circumventing state intrusion as an aspect of
protecting tribal sovereignty. This federal interest stems, in part, from the trust relationship between
the federal government and tribes. See, e.g. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831);
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). Many courts have considered the trust relationship
between tribal and federal governments with regard to tribal lands and resources. See, e.g. United
States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980); Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton,
528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975); Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252
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ulatory authority over air resources within the exterior boundaries of
Indian reservations or other areas under tribal jurisdiction would greatly
threaten the overriding federal objectives of tribal self-government and
self-determination. 143 To this end, Congress expressly designated that the
EPA is to treat tribes as states under the CAA as the sovereign entities
responsible for Indian environments.
States too have interests in regulatory control over environmental protection issues within their borders.' 44 In a legal sense, the strongest state
interest involved in the EPA's proposed territorial jurisdictional grant of
authority to tribes seems to rest primarily with the interests of state
citizens who are nonmembers of the tribes, but who would nonetheless
be subject to off-reservation tribal jurisdiction. 145 Another asserted State
interest is in maintaining a comprehensive and unified regulatory scheme
within the State's territorial borders, such that a single set of standards
applies to those regulated.' 46 In the absence of a unified scheme, the
state would face piecemeal areas of jurisdiction and would thus have
difficulty in administering an otherwise strong and effective program.
Finally, the state regulatory interest at stake also can be substantial "if
the State can point to off-reservation effects that necessitate State intervention. "'41

(D.C. 1972); Dean B. Suagee, Turtle's War Party: An Indian Allegory on Environmental Justice,
9 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 461, 488-89 (1994); Mark Allen, Comment, Native American Control of
Tribal Natural Resource Development in the Context of the Federal Trust and Tribal Self-Determination, 16 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 857 (1989); Brockman, supra note 141, at 139.
143. See cases and materials cited supra note 136 and accompanying text.
144. See generally Jeffrey W. Walbridge, State Minimum Environmental Standards on the Native
American Reservation, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075, 1083-86 (1995) (presenting the following state
interests in the regulation of hazardous waste activities on reservations: prevention of hazardous
waste accidents that have adverse impacts upon the state, the need for uniform pollution control
programs and regulatory schemes, and resolution of jurisdictional disputes in setting land use
regulation standards). See also Leslie Allen, Note, Who Should Control Hazardous Waste on Native
American Lands? Looking Beyond Washington Department of Ecology v. EPA, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q.
69 (1987); Charles F. Wilkinson, Cross-JurisdictionalConflicts: An Analysis of Legitimate State
Interests on Federal and Indian Lands, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 145 (1982).
145. The Department of Environmental Quality for the State of Oklahoma submitted some
interesting comments in response to the proposed rule. It seems, in essence, that Oklahoma challenged
the scope of applicability with regard to the EPA's recommendation that a tribe may rely on 15
U.S.C. § 1151 (1988) as a basis for regulatory jurisdiction beyond established reservation boundaries.
In particular the State of Oklahoma took issue with use of the word "reservation" as is defined
in 25 U.S.C. § 1425. See Oklahoma Letter, supra note 53, at 2. The State encouraged the EPA
to limit use of the term to "include ONLY tribal trust lands in Oklahoma." Id. Oklahoma's
argument apparently is misplaced and seems to resurrect an issue already resolved by the Supreme
Court in Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991).
146. See Letter from El Paso Natural Gas Co. to EPA 1 (Nov. 22, 1994) (on file with author)
(suggesting the proposed territorial approach to jurisdiction will create a "highly fragmented" system
that "is not conducive to effective air quality management"); New Mexico Letter, supra note 56,
at 4 (declaring the proposed rule will create "uncertainty as to whom is the proper regulatory
authority and is not in the best interests of public health"); Letter from New Mexico Municipal
League to EPA pt. IV (Dec. 22, 1994) (stating that the "proposed 'system' is a nightmare in the
). Cf. Allen, supra
making . . . creat[ed by] a web of overlapping and conflicting regulations ....
note 144, at 72-73 (discussing the State of Washington's interests in regulating hazardous waste
activities occurring on reservation lands).
147. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 336 (1983).
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As they pertain to tribal jurisdiction within reservation boundaries,
some of these state interests have been addressed under existing Supreme
Court precedent. 4 The task is much more difficult under the EPA's
proposed language of other areas within their jurisdiction. The EPA has
addressed tribal jurisdiction outside of reservation boundaries under the
CWA's TAS provisions. 49 In response to a commentator concerned with
potential jurisdictional disputes between tribes and states, the EPA responded that the Agency's primary responsibility is the protection of the
nation's environment. 510 Undoubtedly environmental problems cross
boundaries and invoke interdependence by various jurisdictions. 5 ' As
such, the Agency recommends that sovereign entities affected by jurisdictional issues work cooperatively with the goal of environmental protection for all. If these comments reflect the response commentators can
expect from the CAA proposed rule, the issue is likely to be left to
judicial resolution in those instances where the affected tribe and state
do not maintain a cooperative relationship in the environmental regulatory
field.
The EPA also provides some guidance in that it will interpret the term
other areas within their jurisdiction up to the limits of "Indian country"
as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, provided the tribe can show inherent
authority over such area under general principles of Indian law.112 Such
an interpretation is beneficial to some tribes in that it will cover Indian
lands that are not otherwise formally defined as reservations. The net
effect should be that all federally recognized tribes with a tribal land
base, as included under the definition for Indian country, will be able
to apply for TAS status under the Act. Second, the expansive interpretation "preserves exclusive tribal and federal jurisdiction ... [and] policies
of tribal self-government.' ' 5 Fortunately, courts have been willing to
exercise deference with respect to a reasonable EPA interpretation of
statutes the Agency is responsible for administering. 5 4 Although this

148. For example, if the federal government already maintains a comprehensive regulatory scheme
on Native lands, the state interest in a unified scheme could nonetheless be preempted as in White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980). In Bracker, the Supreme Court found
the federal government's regulatory scheme for the harvesting of timber on reservation lands to be
comprehensive and pervasive and thus preemptive of state tax laws. Id. at 152-53. In Mescalero
Apache Tribe, the Supreme Court held the existing federal laws creating a joint and comprehensive
regulatory scheme over hunting and fishing on the reservation to preempt the state's asserted
jurisdiction. 462 U.S. 324.
Tribal governments also have an explicit interest in a unified regulatory scheme comprised of
consistent standards and unabridged authority over all areas of Indian Country. Brockman, supra
note 141, at 139. In fact, a complete recognition of this interest would eliminate the emergence of
regulatory jurisdictional quagmires similar to those that emerged in other criminal and civil contexts.
149. See generally Treatment of Indian Tribes as States for Purposes of the Clean Water Act,
58 Fed. Reg. 67,966, 67,976-67,977 (Dec. 22, 1993).
150. See 58 Fed. Reg. at 67,976.
151. See id.
152. 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,960.
153. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 116, at 111.
154. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984);
Washington Dep't of Ecology v. United States EPA, 752 F.2d 1465, 1466 (9th Cir. 1985).
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analysis further supports a finding of federal preemption, it still leaves
open the instance where the asserted tribal jurisdiction covers non-native
activities occurring within the "other areas under the tribe's jurisdiction,"
an issue to be most readily challenged. Tribes will have to show an
inherent source of tribal authority over these activities on a case-by-case
basis.
V. INHERENT TRIBAL AUTHORITY TO REGULATE
ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES OVER INDIAN LANDS AND
OTHER AREAS WITHIN THE TRIBE'S JURISDICTION
The final argument in support of the EPA's proposed territorial view
is that inherent tribal regulatory jurisdiction exists over air resources.
Inherent tribal authority as a basis for tribal regulatory jurisdiction is
less than certain under existing federal legal precedent and "is viewed
with suspicion by the non-Indian community .... "I" Under general
principles of federal Indian law, an analysis of asserted tribal authority
begins by determining whether the tribe maintains inherent authority over
the particular conduct or area at issue. With regard to the reservation
environment, some commentators suggest that indeed "[tiribal authority
to regulate in Indian country arises from the inherent sovereign powers
of the native nations."'' I 6 The argument is based on an understanding
that tribes retain all inherent sovereign authority not otherwise "ceded
by treaty, excised by federal legislation, or divested by the courts."' 5 7
The EPA's interpretation of inherent tribal authority, notwithstanding
Supreme Court precedent, should be taken one step further. Even without
a direct grant of federal authority, tribes generally have inherent authority
over reservation activities.' 8 Nothing in the language of the CAA purports
to diminish tribal regulatory authority over environmental matters. In
fact, the language specifically affirms inherent tribal authority over "air
resources within the exterior boundaries of the reservation." An argument
could be made that the 1990 CAA Amendments recognizing inherent
tribal authority over air quality regulations is a congressional affirmation
of a tribe's existing inherent regulatory authority despite the Supreme
Court plurality's language in Brendale. Under this argument, the EPA
would not need to find an express delegation of authority for tribes,
and a simple federal preemption analysis would apply. Furthermore, the
argument is consistent with the opinions of Justices Blackman, Brennan,
and Marshall who concurred in part and dissented in part to the Brendale
decision. According to Justice Blackman,

155. Suagee & Stearns, supra note 59, at 76.
156. Royster & Fausett, supra note 14, at 593.
157. Id. at 594 (citing United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978)). "Indian tribes still posses
those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by implication as a necessary
result of their dependent status." Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323.
158. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (recognizing exclusive tribal authority
over tribal members and territory).
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to recognize that Montana strangely reversed the otherwise consistent
presumption in favor of inherent tribal sovereignty .. . is not to
excise the decision. . . .Despite the reversed presumption, . . Montana itself expressly preserves substantial tribal authority over nonIndian activity on reservations, including fee lands .... 19
If a court were not to uphold the EPA's interpretation of the delegation
and inquire as to the tribal authority to regulate within the context of
the CAA, this line of argument remains important. The courts may not
uphold the EPA's interpretation, and there still remains the need for
some basis of Tribal regulatory authority. Admittedly, this is a very
difficult argument to make, but it should not be overlooked as a secondary
source of authority to support tribal authority. Additionally, there are
members of the Supreme Court who criticize the Court's seeming indifference to inherent tribal sovereignty,'16 and the Court has yet to specifically address "whether tribal authority could be premised on the
16
consent of non-members.'
Inherent regulatory jurisdiction is consistent with the inherent civil
authority of tribes affirmed under existing legal precedent and may include
authority over non-Indians sufficient to include the EPA's proposed
interpretation for regulatory jurisdiction.' 62 Justice Stewart, writing for
the majority in Montana, stated:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise
some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations,
even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation,
licensing, or other means, the activities of non-members who enter
consensual relationships with the tribe or its members .... 163
Despite the contrary language of the plurality in Brendale, lower courts
continue to use Montana as the leading federal precedent on tribal civil
jurisdiction. '6 The EPA's proposed rule generally recognizes the inherent
sovereign authority of tribes over those air resources within the exterior
boundaries of a reservation without distinguishing among the various
classifications of reservation land. 165 This interpretation is consistent with
existing precedent regarding the inherent nature of tribes' sovereign status

159. Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 462
(1989) (Blackman, Brennan, Marshall, JJ., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (emphasis in
original).
160. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309, 2321 (1993) (Blackmun, J.,dissenting)
(sharply criticizing the majority's "bare nod" to the Cheyenne River Tribe's inherent authority to
regulate hunting and fishing and acknowledging that tribes possess inherent authority which extends
"over both their members and their territory").
161. CLINTON ET AL., supra note 116, at 111 (citing Philip P. Frickey, Marshalling Past and
Present: Colonialism, Constitutionalism, and Interpretation in Federal Indian Law, 107 HARv. L.
REV. 381, 438 n.243 (1993)).
162. See United States v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
163. Id. (emphasis added).
164. See, e.g., FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes, 905 F.2d 1311, 1314 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1404 (1991).
165. 59 Fed. Reg. at 43,958-43,959.
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as governmental entities. One author, analyzing Washington Department
of Ecology v. EPA, has suggested that, at least in the field of hazardous

waste management, tribes are probably more concerned with sovereignty
than with health or the environment.' 66 Unquestionably, tribes have many
important interests at stake with regard to environmental litigation, one
of which is sovereignty. This interest, however, is not unique to tribal

governments. 167 The author supports this argument by finding that tribes
view states "as adversaries who try to take from tribes what power they
still retain."' 68 The author concludes by finding that the legal significance
of the tribal interest in sovereignty is uncertain under the Supreme Court's
decision in Rice v. Rehner. 6 9 The Court, in Rice, addressed the issue
of whether California could require a federally licensed business owner,
operating a liquor store on a reservation, to obtain a state liquor license.
In conducting a federal preemption analysis, the Court includes as part
tribes historically exercised regulatory
of the analysis whether Indian
70
sales.1
liquor
over
authority
The Court's decision in Rice has little weight in the environmental
arena. Unlike the liquor license laws at issue in Rice, the environmental

166. See Allen, supra note 144, at 104. Another author has gone as far as to recommend federal
legislation which would authorize the Secretary of the Interior to "waive tribal sovereignty and
allow states to enforce their regulations when necessary to reduce pollution of the state's environment."
Roger Romulus Martella, Note, "Not in My State's Indian Reservation"--A Legislative Fix to Close
an Environmental Law Loophole, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1863, 1889 (1994). This recommendation comes
about in light of the fact that the judicial system would require the state to show an "exceptional
circumstance" sufficient to permit the assertion of state authority over the regulated area. Id. To
circumvent this, the author suggests a legislative model that would waive tribal sovereign immunity
where state regulations "would improve the environment" and where state regulations are more
stringent than existing tribal regulations. Id. at 1891. While the author's general concern for the
environment is commendable, such a solution only serves to highlight the approach taken by some
to preserve state authority (sovereignty) over their citizens and lands. It fails to recognize the sovereign
status of tribes and instead reduces tribal sovereignty to something which is "waiveable" to protect
state interests. At no point does this author suggest that tribal statutes apply extraterritorially to
state activities where they are damaging, or threaten to damage, the tribes' environment. Id. at
1890. With these types of inequitable "fixes" to environmental issues and the blatant disregard for
the sovereign responsibilities tribes have over their lands and peoples, it is no wonder tribes are
forced into defensive postures regarding their sovereign status as Indian nations.
167. See e.g., Oklahoma Letter, supra note 53, at cmts. 1-6 ("[U]nder EPA's definition, almost
all of the State of Oklahoma would be a reservation . . . . In Oklahoma, tribal trust land is
surrounded by the State of Oklahoma and any tribal air programs should be compatible with the
Oklahoma program."); UARG Letter, supra note 56, at 13-16 (providing a constitutional analysis
of the EPA's proposed interpretation of regulatory jurisdiction and stating, "a state has no authority
to regulate directly activity that takes place exclusively inside the boundaries of another state, because
the Constitution does nothing to alter the basic principle that each state is sovereign within its own
territory." Id. at 15 (citations omitted)).
168. Allen, supra note 144, at 105. See also VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN
INDIANS, AMERICAN JUSTICE 52 (1983) (discussing some of the difficulties that arise in tribal/state
relations and noting how hostility emerges when the two compete economically).
169. 463 U.S. 713 (1983) (looking to the tribe's historical exercise of tribal regulatory authority
over liquor sales as part of the preemption analysis conducted by the Court).
170. The Court's "historical" analysis as explained by Justice O'Conner, writing for the majority,
is "[u]nlike the authority to tax certain transactions on reservations that we have characterized as
'a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain' . . . tradition simply has not recognized
a sovereign immunity or inherent authority in favor of liquor regulation by Indians." Id. at 722
(quoting Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152
(1980)).
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regulatory authority of tribes has been explicitly recognized by Congress
in most major federal environmental statutes. '7' This line of reasoning
is also not supported by the Court's decision in California v. Cabazon
1 72
Band of Mission Indians
which held that the state's regulatory gaming
laws could not be applied to Indian gaming activities where federal and
tribal laws pervade the regulated area.' 73 The Court did not apply the
"historical" analysis of Rice in reaching this conclusion. Furthermore,
unlike the regulated area in Rice and RCRA, there are existing TAS
regulatory schemes established under the CAA, CWA, and SDWA to
which the Court can look. A significant issue which arises under an
analysis based on inherent authority is how to include those tribes unable
to make such a showing. Undeniably, there would be many tribes unable
to show inherent authority, and perhaps this is where the safer EPA
analysis serves its most useful purpose. Certainly, the EPA believes a
tribe-by-tribe basis must be found regarding the extent of tribal jurisdiction
over fee lands and leaves the final decision of a firm, express congressional
delegation under the CAA to judicial and congressional authorities.
In sum, the argument for inherent tribal authority, even with the legal
obstacles and difficulties, is important for the reason that "[in every
instance where tribes, with inherent powers to act, act instead under a
delegation of federal authority, the perception of inherent tribal authority
is diminished."' 7 4 The history of federal Indian law is replete with examples
highlighting such a result. The argument is also relevant because it is
analogous to tribal inherent authority to tax 75 and distinguishable from
areas of criminal law, which primarily depend upon express delegation.
Furthermore, the EPA provides that if a tribe seeks jurisdiction over
other areas within the tribes jurisdiction it may need to make such a
showing.
CONCLUSION
This Comment focused on the proposed implementation scheme of the
CAA by tribes. The Comment examined the EPA's position and interpretation of the CAA as a federal congressional delegation of authority

171. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. See also Martella, supra note 166 at 1883-86
(applying the preemption test to the imposition of state environmental regulations in Indian country
and finding "states face significant-and perhaps insurmountable-obstacles" depending on the
nature of the regulated activity).
172. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
173. Id. at 216 (noting that "state jurisdiction is pre-empted ... if it interferes with or is
incompatible with federal and tribal interests ... unless the state interests at stake are sufficient
to justify the assertion of state authority").
174. Royster & Fausett, supra note 14, at 597. As long as states continue to use non-Indians or
the status of the land a the trump cards leading the Supreme Court into further obscurity with
regard to sovereignty issues. See also Allen, supra note 144, at 105 ("Because cases addressing
jurisdiction over Native American reservations draw from all types of regulatory situations, there
is the distinct possibility that the assertion of state authority in an area that benefits Native American
tribes may be used as precedent for a less beneficial regulatory arrangement in the future.").
175. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 152 (recognizing the authority to tax as a fundament attribute of
sovereignty exercised by tribes).
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to tribes. The Agency sets forth federal case law, statutory interpretation,
legislative history, and other CAA provisions that support an inference
of a valid federal delegation of authority. Nevertheless, the Agency falls
short of fully supporting its interpretation of the "extent and nature"
of the delegation that is contained in the Act's language of "or other
areas within the tribe's jurisdiction." Supreme Court decisions and principles of federal Indian law nonetheless support the Agency's position.
Additional support for a valid delegation of authority is found within
EPA's policy statements regarding the administration of environmental
programs and regulations within Indian environments. If a court would
find no express delegation under the Act, the EPA's interpretation of
the statute should be supported under a general federal preemption
analysis, including the Bracker balancing analysis. Furthermore, there
remains a valid argument that tribes maintain inherent sovereign authority
over their environments. Given all the relevant considerations, the CAA
may be said to contain a sustainable grant of regulatory jurisdiction to
treat tribes as states under the Act's provisions.
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